Pakistan II

A quick bit on the not-Musharraf political look on Pakistan. It is often said but more frequently forgotten that the so-called Islamist parties in Pakistan have never managed more than a very meager poll showing. The emergency rule should not be excused as a move to prevent the beardies from taking over with their ninja turtles behind them. The folks being detained are affiliated with the legal system or are political opponents of Musharraf.

On the other hand, something similar could be said about pre-Revolution Iran. Despite the importance of Qom to Muslim scholarship and power, Iran did not have a history of political control by religious [I am loathe to use the word] extremists. However, when the people began to move against the Shah, the more powerful Communists made common cause with the Muslims seeking Islamic rule in overthrowing what was unquestionably a horrible leader. It was only after the Revolution began to get traction that the Islamic side began to gain power and until near the end, it was not certain that the Revolution would not be written into history as a victory over the capital class by the working class.

For Pakistan, there are major differences, despite the similar beginning of a loud but politically fringe religious group. First, there is no major, semi-mainstream secular group with which they can partner as they could with the Communists in Iran. Second, the level of oppression and polarization under the Shah makes Musharraf look like a plumper Mr. Rogers. Third, and most important, the "Islamists," as they are called here, are much less a monolithic group than they were in Iran. If you ask the average, high awareness American where the Pakistani "Islamists" come from, they will say Saudi madrasseh. Leaving aside the mixed bag that is the Arab-financed religious education in South Asia, a lot of people who that American would label "Islamist" want nothing at all to do with the Saudis, their madrasseh, or the ideology related to them. These just make for a good and notable target because they are an out-group among an out-group in Pakistan.

My last point about Pakistan relates more closely with my earlier post. The most frustrating aspect to the whole business of the emergency rule (apart from the human rights of the people beaten and detained) is that while the actions are despicable, there is no one else to take over and that is Musharraf's fault. He cannot pass the buck after having ruled alone for a decade. The opposition is the same as it was when he came to power and they are still unacceptable. By building oppositional political structures, Musharraf would have faced criticism just as he did by allowing freedom of the press. However, it would have been a greater threat to his power as it could not be shut down on a whim as he has shown the Pakistani media still can. The benefit to having an oppositional political system, however, only shows up after he has gone, just as the benefits to a stable, powerful, multinational system of global justice only shows up for America after we are done being hegemonic.

The only way for real improvement now is for someone who is not interested in power for themselves to make tremendously personally risky moves to take over Pakistan by a transparent and optimistic process. This, in face of the great power of Musharraf and Bhutto and the potentially violent demands of the minority who want greater Islamic control of the state. After coming to power, he or she must continue Musharraf's work while pushing the country towards a sustainable system of governance, including rigorous critiques from opponents who, by the unrest fomented by their criticisms, will not allow him or her to finish the job they start. In other words, following the emergency rule, Pakistan needs to find a rainbow-colored, lucky four-leaf clover in the shape of a horseshoe with a big pot of gold beneath it. Also, they need Musharraf, Bhutto and Sharif to retire with their fortunes and leave Pakistan the hell alone.