Monday, November 26, 2007

Pakistan III


Some folks have been making the easy logical mistake of thinking that because there is a) instability in Pakistan and b) a bunch of Taliban and al Qaeda taking refuge in the north of that country that the influx of the latter have some causality towards the former. This is so barely accurate that I hesitate to even acknowledge it due to the greater damage done by the misconception. For the ongoing revolt in Swat, the influx is certainly not helping and it causes a distraction and disincentive to military action in the area.

The broader, more seriously problematic instability is a function of the misrule of Musharraf, the peculiarities of Pakistani politics and the realities of trying to govern a country with vast wealth stratification, cultural divides and reverberating historical troubles. It does not, however, have to do with some gun toting beardies from Afghanistan piling over the border. For my take on the likelihood of "Islamist" takeover in Pakistan, see the Pakistan II post.

If it were not for the misery and injustice involved in jailing of activists, journalists, judges and lawyers and the pathetic excuse that the martial law was in reaction to Islamist threats, I would still be behind Musharraf 100%. His influence had been positive and apart from his myopic views of the problems of Pakistan, he was governing in a way that lines up well with what Pakistan needs. It seems unlikely that electoral politics or the chaos of a coup would bring as suitable a leader but the results of martial law are completely unacceptable. This puts me in the awkward position of at once demanding an end to martial law, release of the captives and reinstatement of the judiciary as well as not really advocating a change in the power structure until a more suitable method for grooming political leaders is in place.

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